-
Wed May 01 2024 Alex Burmashev <alexander.burmashev@oracle.com> - 8.7p1-38.0.1
- Update upstream references [Orabug: 36564626]
-
Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-38
- Fix Terrapin attack
Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
-
Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-37
- Fix Terrapin attack
Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
-
Wed Dec 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-36
- Fix Terrapin attack
Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
- Relax OpenSSH build-time checks for OpenSSL version
Related: RHEL-4734
- Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname
Resolves: CVE-2023-51385
-
Mon Oct 23 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-35
- Relax OpenSSH checks for OpenSSL version
Resolves: RHEL-4734
- Limit artificial delays in sshd while login using AD user
Resolves: RHEL-2469
- Move users/groups creation logic to sysusers.d fragments
Resolves: RHEL-5222
-
Thu Jul 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-34
- Avoid remote code execution in ssh-agent PKCS#11 support
Resolves: CVE-2023-38408
-
Tue Jun 13 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-33
- Allow specifying validity interval in UTC
Resolves: rhbz#2115043
-
Wed May 24 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-32
- Fix pkcs11 issue with the recent changes
- Delete unnecessary log messages from previous compl-dh patch
- Add ssh_config man page explanation on rhbz#2068423
- Resolves: rhbz#2207793, rhbz#2209096
-
Tue May 16 2023 Norbert Pocs <npocs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-31
- Fix minor issues with openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch:
- Check return values
- Use EVP API to get the size of DH
- Add some log debug lines
- Related: rhbz#2091694
-
Thu Apr 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-30
- Some non-terminating processes were listening on ports.
Resolves: rhbz#2177768
- On sshd startup, we check whether signing using the SHA1 for signing is
available and don't use it when it isn't.
- On ssh private key conversion we explicitly use SHA2 for testing RSA keys.
- In sshd, when SHA1 signatures are unavailable, we fallback (fall forward :) )
to SHA2 on host keys proof confirmation.
- On a client side we permit SHA2-based proofs from server when requested SHA1
proof (or didn't specify the hash algorithm that implies SHA1 on the client
side). It is aligned with already present exception for RSA certificates.
- We fallback to SHA2 if SHA1 signatures is not available on the client side
(file sshconnect2.c).
- We skip dss-related tests (they don't work without SHA1).
Resolves: rhbz#2070163
- FIPS compliance efforts for dh, ecdh and signing
Resolves: rhbz#2091694